Collective bargaining and budget deficits

So it was collective bargaing that caused the state budget crises circulating the United States, right?  I'm certainly not a union appologist- but let me offer a second solution.

A revenue bubble caused by housing policy caused the state budget crises.  It began with a new innovation in the mortgage industry- the mortgage backed security.  Back in the 1980's- savings and loans would take deposits from customers and then offer mortgages from those deposits.   However, this limited the number of loans that could be made (at least in theory).   Every loan required a proportional amount of money in reserve.   Securitization of loans changed this.  Through securitization, loans could be sold on a market.   Once loans were off the books- and into the hands of a 3rd party- lenders could issue more loans.  They quickly found out that they could make more money selling loans than they could holding them.   As these loans became more numerous- politicians were asked, then asked again, to regulate them.   Neither Republicans nor Democrats wanted any part of this- as to do so would limit home ownership rates.   Instead, they basked in the glory of an accelerating housing market.   More and more people were realizing the American dream. 

As the housing market accelerated, ratings agencies- who were tasked with rating the newly securitized debt.   However, these industries quickly succumbed to the allure of money- rather than the nitty gritty work of effectively analyzing this debt.  Banks came to ratings agencies expecting AAA ratings (the highest rating).   If Moody's would not give it to them, they went to S&P, and vice versa.  This quickly became a conflict of interest- for if ratings agencies wanted market share- the path was to keep the banks happy.   Before long, nearly every basket of loans was AAA, creating what was essentially a false demand for more mortgages.  A bubble.   Standards shot- the banks felt free to loosen their credit standards.  If every loan could be sold in a AAA basket-  it didn't matter who they gave a loan- no matter their credit worthiness.   The loans were easy to sell- and with a AAA rating- they sold at a premium price on the market.   The house of cards was stacked.

The housing market exploded- and nearly everyone benefitted.  Although the revenue bubble was not caused by public sector unions- they certainly benefited from it in the short term.   It's funny now that some people blame unions for bankrupting state coffers.   As if the money that went toward salaries of unionized employees would not have gone somewhere else.   Even my 3 year knows that no matter the size of the cookie- he had better eat it- lest someone else come along and take it from him (that would be me).   I do know of one state that put money aside for the recession- Montana.   Good for Montana.   Smart.

The point here is that collective bargaining was no more the cause of the state deficits than it was the cause of the state surpluses which preceded it.   To cast collective bargaining as the problem- as is currently being done in Wisconsin- is nothing more than politics.  The public sector will be forced to take less money now- just like they got more money when states were fiscally strong.   But to point the finger to the collective bargaining process- is scapegoating- not problem solving.   I think we all deserve much more of the latter.

And if we want to have a debate over collecting bargaining- or giving people choice when joining a union- let's have that argument.    But let's have that argument over the merits.    It could prove a much more useful dialogue than what is going on now.   And perhaps we could all be made better off- I nominate the governor from Montana to lead the discussion.

I am mildly obsessed with instituting business practices in the world of teaching- or what I would call, "incentivizing" the profession. After teaching for more than 10 years of teaching I've come to the following conclusion about the practice; there are virtually no financial incentives to becoming a better teacher. Zippo. When I look at making more money I'm surrounded by few prospects. I could 1) Coach a sport- every day after school for 2 hours ( or more). I know a lot of great coaches, and a lot of great teachers who coach. But there is no possible way that coaching doesn't come at the cost of teaching. 2) Become an administrator- In other words, get out of teaching. 3) Get Nationally Board Certified or get some more post graduate credits- although I'm not really convinced that will make me a better teacher- it will get me some extra money. 4) Do some other non-teaching related activies.

What I really need is some incentive to work harder, or work more efficiently than I already do, in the profession I view (its why I signed up for it afterall) as one of the most important there is, teaching. I need some incentive to look hard at my practice, to think about how I do it and why I do it, and make the changes needed to get better. What I really need is somebody to say, "if you do this, or if you reach this goal, I will give you more money. But when you look around, there's not many incentives to do that. That's not to say I don't work hard. But when 4pm roles around, I'd rather be with my family than spend time at work if my family is not going to get anything out of it (ie: a nice vacation). That's why I love reflections like this over on InterAct in California.

If anyone is out there who can help me reach my goal- please contact me (insert silent prayer here).

The Game of Teacher Evaluations

Game theory is a way to help us understand how rational individuals and groups make decisions. With broad applications from sociology to economics, I thought I'd give its application a try in the world of teacher evaluations, specifically, to help explain why so few teachers in MCPS are placed into Montgomery County's Peer Assistance and Review program, a program to support struggling teachers who show improvement and dismiss struggling teachers who do not.


The following application of game theory is based on several assumptions. And admittedly, assumptions, like the housing market will always go up, can be dangerous. I also take a complex issue, which involves many variables, and make it simple. But my hope is that even a crude analysis can provide some insights into the problem with evaluation systems in education as they exist today. One important side note: while game theory may help explain why most people act a certain way most of the time, it certainly cannot explain why all people choose to act in the way they do. Now to the good stuff.

In game theory, a payoff matrix is used to help understand the possible outcomes that individuals or groups face given two choices. The figure above is such a matrix. It works under the presumption that people will consider their payoffs when making decisions, which in turn helps us understand why many rational people, faced with the same set of circumstances, make the same decision. The figure above, is the payoff matrix for the choices faced by evaluators and ineffective teachers, to work hard (max effort), or to take it easy (min effort).

Let us first consider the evaluator, the person who is primarily responsible for determining whether a teacher receives a satisfactory or unsatisfactory evaluation. The evaluator has two choices. The first is to exert maximum effort, and thus proceed to document and place considerable time and effort in the process of placing the teacher into the PAR system. The second choice, is to exert minimum effort. In this scenario the evaluator does not place the struggling teacher in the PAR system, but enjoys the added benefit of more time to address other issues. In the payoff matrix, we assume that a rational actor is interested in making their life simpler, and thus minimizing effort. I assign no value to exerting maximum effort, but a (+1) value to exerting minimum effort. I assign additional value to removal of the struggling teacher. If the evaluator is able to remove the teacher through placement into the PAR system, I assign a (+1) value, but if the teacher is not removed, I assign a value of zero. This leaves the following payout structure for the evaluator:


0 = Considerable effort , but no teacher removal

1 = Minimum effort, and no teacher removal

1 = Considerable effort, and teacher removal

2 = Minimum effort, and teacher removal



The ineffective teacher has slightly different payouts, but the same choices. Like the evaluator, the ineffective teacher may exert either maximum or minimum effort, but would prefer to minimize effort. Like the evaluator, I assign a (+1) value to minimizing effort and no value to maximizing effort. On the other hand, the teacher has an incentive to keep his or her job. When he or she keeps their job and thus receives scheduled step increases, I assign a value of (+1). However, because of the negative consequences associated with losing one's job, I assign a (-1) value to this outcome. This leaves the teacher with the following possible payouts:

-1= Considerable effort, and loss of job

0 = Considerable effort, and same rate of pay

0 = Minimum effort, and loss of job

1 = Minimum effort, and same rate of pay

Analysis of the payoff matrix allows us to understand why so few teachers end up dismissed from their job, and why a new system is needed that changes the payout structure for both teachers and evaluators.

Evaluators would like to remove ineffective teachers, but they understand this requires considerable effort. Let's assume evaluators don't mind this extra effort, but only if this effort pays off in the removal of the ineffective teacher. Once the evaluator places the teacher in the PAR system however, the tenured teacher has two options. The first option is to continue to place minimum effort into his or her job. However, already in the PAR system, this option will result in his or her dismissal. There is now a substantial carrot for the ineffective teacher to put in more effort in order to avoid dismissal. The result of the evaluator exerting maximum effort, is thus a payout value of zero for the evaluator, who faces a now motivated teacher willling to do what is necessary to keep their job.

Faced with the likely consequence that a teacher will not be removed even if he or she is placed in the PAR system, the rational evaluator is more likely to put forth minimum effort. In other words, the evaluator will not take the time consuming steps of putting the ineffective teacher in PAR. In this scenario, the ineffective teacher is not placed in the PAR system, but the evaluator does not have the headache associated with documenting the placement. The evaluator's life has become substantially easier. The rational ineffective teacher now has the option to either exert maximum effort to become a better teacher or to exert minimum effort, but devoid of consequences for exerting minimum effort, will likely make this choice.

In game theory, we call the above solution, the solution in which each participant acts in their own self-interest (regardless of the decision made by their "opponent"), the Nash equilibrium. In our game, this means both the evaluator and the ineffective teacher will choose to put forth minimum effort. This of course, has a negative consequence for the state of education as a whole, despite the "positive" outcome associated with the decisions made by the individual.

When teachers and administrators have incentives to do just enough to get by, something is broken. And while no one should believe all teachers are just out for survivial, we must create incentives for performances we value.

Race to the Top (RTTP) may very well give states and districts the opportunity to change this payout structure for both teachers and evaluators. Any effective evaluation system, must not only have negative consequences of failure, but positive consequences of success. And my next entry will try to explain how such a pay-off matrix will look and feel.

Readers Respond: Baltimore Sun

Some of my thoughts on the hand-wringing going on over teacher evaluations in Montgomery County. Seems like the pendulum is in motion in other states, and it'd be best for MCPS and MCEA to get on board or be left behind.

More on the evaluation system

State Senator Paul Pinsky wrote this op-ed piece in the Baltimore Sun. Of course, at the bottom of this op-ed is the little disclaimer that Paul Pinsky is actually an employee of MCEA. I can't even fathom that our great state has employees of interest groups working as lawmakers, but perhaps that's another matter. What I really don't understand is the the attitude of MCEA on this matter. When the legislation was worded that student achievement data had to be a "significant" factor in evaluations MCEA just celebrated that no change was ncessary. Now that Nancy Grasmick is suggesting that the MCPS evaluation system might need to be changed after all, the union is up at arms. The current evaluation system is NOT perfect. It's not! Why wouldn't the MCEA want to reevaluate their system if it possibly means it could improve? What they really want to change is nothing.

A good one

Find a debate here about the merit of teacher unions (click on audio/visual tab to access).

Two of the more convincing points were made by Terry Moe, a professor of political science at Stanford University:

On average, it takes two years, $200,000, and 15% of the principal's total time to get one bad teacher out of the classroom. As a result, principals don't even try. They give 99% of teachers -- no joke -- satisfactory evaluations. The bad teachers just stay in the classroom. Well, if we figure that maybe 5% of the teachers, that's a conservative estimate, are bad teachers nationwide, that means that 2.5 million kids are stuck in classrooms with teachers who aren't teaching them anything. This is devastating...

...The seniority rules often require districts to lay off junior people before senior people. It's happening all around the country now. And some of these junior people are some of the best teachers in the district. And some of the senior people that are being saved are the worst. Okay. So just ask yourself, would anyone in his right mind organize schools in this way, if all they cared about was what's best for kids? And the answer is no. But this is the way our schools are actually organized. And it's due largely to the power of the unions.

I would like to add that I do take issue with the way the debate question is framed (Don't blame teacher unions for our failing schools), even if done just for the sake of spurring interest in debate. Blaming one variable for such a dynamic issue is irresponsible and an over simplification. But unions are, as currently organized, and by the issues that they choose to champion, major impediments to reform. It is for this reason that I believe teacher unions need to under go major institutional and ideological changes if they are going to contribute to a better educational system.

And again, "Why aren't more teachers in PAR?"

This is from a 2004 report from the Montgomery County shared accountability office:

Referral Rate for Experienced Teachers

Since the program began in the 2000-2001 school year, 315 tenured MCPS teachers have been referred to PAR.3 District officials have raised the question about why this number is “so low.” Principals were asked precisely this. The answers, varied and instructive, fall into the six categories of response, described below:

Unwillingness to give up on teachers—The majority of principals are interested in helping teachers to improve their practice. They believe, “If I just try a little harder, work a little more with this teacher” things will get better. In MCPS, placing an experienced teacher in PAR sends a signal that the teacher is at risk of being terminated.4 One principal’s comments sum up the views of many: “It’s gut-wrenching. These [teachers] are not strangers. You know their stories. They’re not evil people.”

Concern that referral to PAR reflects negatively on the principal—A number of principals expressed concern that referring an experienced teacher to PAR reflects negatively on them as principals. The teacher being referred is often someone the principal has selected, or helped to select, for the position at the school. Some significant fraction of principals believe that if they refer teachers to PAR, it indicates, “we made a mistake selecting that teacher in the first place” and that “mistake” will translate into something negative on the principal’s evaluation.

Not wanting to roil school waters—Some principals say that knowledge that an experienced teacher has been referred to PAR creates tension at the school. “Other teachers become nervous, or think I’m picking on the teacher.” As a result, some principals admit, they do not refer teachers who ought to be referred to PAR so as to keep peace among the faculty.

The time factor—A number of principals admit that they refer fewer tenured teachers to PAR than might benefit from the assistance because of the time it takes for them to prepare a submission to the PAR Panel. Principals are required to complete two formal observations (down from three). Each of these, by some estimates, requires as long as three hours of the principal’s time. “Sometimes I just miss the deadline because I don’t get the work done in time,” commented one principal whose remarks spoke for a number of colleagues.

Holdover concerns about MCEA—A few principals report they are reluctant to refer experienced teachers to PAR because they are worried, based on history, that “MCEA will make things difficult”. None of the principals interviewed could point to an actual instance in which, since the inception of PAR, the union has attempted to stymie the process. Nevertheless, there is an anticipatory reaction among principals that seems to make some of them more reluctant than they otherwise might be to
recommend tenured teachers to PAR.

Newness of the system, newness of many principals—Finally, PAR is a relatively new system for MCPS. Given the staggered implementation of the PGS, some principals have had a year or two of experience with PAR, but fully one-third of principals began to implement the system just this school year. Compounding the newness of the system is the newness of many principals. Familiarity and comfort with the process likely will encourage greater use of it.

Again, the last pagagraph is simply not supported by the data. The time factor rings home to me. Although, I might call it the "it's a pain" factor.

I will tell you this, and let there be no doubt, if principals were paid extra for great assessment data, more teachers would be on PAR.

Weast on Race to the Top

So I read this, and from what I understand, Jerry Weast's main point is that MCPS already does evaluation of teachers so well that it would have to be wary of changing anything that is already so good. He was almost dubious that Maryland could have a better idea than his. Ok then.

In the Post

The Maryland legislature recently passed a new law that says test scores will be a "significant" component of teacher evaluations. All this to get in line to receive "Race to the Top" funds doled out by the Obama administration. Sounds like a start. Doesn't a good teacher help students learn? And how do we measure learning? Assessment. The Washington Post reports that the MCEA and school system leaders agreed to make 1/3rd of teacher evaluations dependent on test scores. Then Doug Prouty, MCEA President, promptly sends this email to union members that says nothing has changed, nor should it. Montgomery County is the model!

We have not changed our evaluation in anyway. We have no intention of doing so. The Teacher Professional Growth System has served us well for the past ten years and is a model for other systems around the country. The focus on collecting authentic data through formal and informal observations, bolstered by other data sources (including student achievement) has provided more meaningful feedback to teachers than the previous evaluation system or that currently being used by any other county in Maryland. The structured support for teachers and other educators the system provides is also unique in our state.

If MCEA doesn't think our evaluation system should imporve, or that the current law doesn't provide an opportunity to improve it, they are taking a decidedly narrow approach. It takes two years to remove even the most ineffective tenured teacher. Further, test scores are used in name only. Two out of six standards by which teachers are evaluated have mention of the use of assessment data. To say that test scores are already a significant portion of the Montgomery County evaluation system could not be further from reality.